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THE CONFUSION OF TRADEMARK 
TERRITORIALITY 
JOSEPH MICHAEL LEVY 
Imagine this: company A holds a trademark in HOTEL X. These hotels 
are abundant in New York City, but company A does not operate outside of 
New York. Company B likes the name HOTEL X and decides to open a swath 
of HOTEL Xs in San Francisco. Company A has been advertising on the 
Internet for many years and explicitly targets California residents who seek 
a vacation in New York. 
One might expect a court to apply a traditional “likelihood of 
confusion” test to determine whether there has been trademark 
infringement. Yet, under current doctrine, this infringement analysis may be 
rendered meaningless. At common law and under federal statutory law, old-
fashioned notions of territoriality can bar a finding of infringement or 
prevent an injunction, even if the court holds that confusion is likely. Thus, 
in our hypothetical, the fact that company A operates only in New York could 
be dispositive and ultimately stop it from enjoining company B’s use in 
California. 
This doctrine is outdated. Trademark law must be updated to serve its 
underlying purpose: the prevention of consumer confusion. This article 
proposes a simple way by which courts can accomplish this. Instead of 
applying a separate test of territoriality, courts should instead use only the 
infringement analysis to determine the scope of trademark rights and 
remedies. This territoriality-infringement synthesis would not only simplify 
the doctrine but would also serve to protect consumers who may be confused 
despite a lack of geographic proximity. And these consumers are no longer 
rare. Although territoriality may have once been a good proxy for predicting 
whether consumers will be confused, those days are far behind us. Today, 
trademarks do not have the same geographic limits due to the Internet and 
a perambulating society. These changes render traditional notions of 
“territory” under-protective, and until trademark doctrine accounts for the 
modern world, it will be just as confused the consumers it fails to protect. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trademark law is confused. At common law and under the Lanham Act, 
trademark holders must deal with outdated rules about territoriality. At 
common law, different owners may use similar marks as long as these marks 
are used in geographically remote areas.1 Because of this, courts analyzing a 
common law trademark tend to first determine whether two marks are used 
in non-remote locations, and then proceed to undergo an infringement 
analysis, i.e., the likelihood of confusion test. 2  If the marks are used 
 
 1. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918). 
 2. E.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); DeCosta v. 
Viacom Int’l, Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 606 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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remotely, then the court stops the inquiry without looking to likelihood of 
confusion. 
So too under the Lanham Act. Due to the Dawn Donut rule, a senior 
user is unable to receive an injunction if a junior has used the mark in an area 
that is remote from the senior. 3  Like the common law, this doctrine is 
premised on the notion that consumers will not be confused by similar marks 
used in different areas.4 However, despite its claims about confusion, this 
inquiry is entirely separate from the infringement analysis. Thus, whether the 
common law or Lanham Act controls, a trademark holder still must separate 
the infringement analysis from the question of territoriality. 
This process is unnecessarily longwinded. Under both common law and 
statutory law, consumer confusion fuels trademark territoriality. As one 
judge emphasized, likelihood of confusion serves as a “touchstone” when 
determining the trade area. 5  As such, this paper will demonstrate that 
confusion should frame the entire inquiry. There is no need to undergo a 
separate territoriality analysis if a court determines that consumers are likely 
to be confused. Because the whole goal of territoriality is to prevent 
consumer confusion, likelihood of confusion alone should establish a prima 
facie of trademark infringement sufficient to enjoin the junior user. 
At first glance, this may seem like an unimportant issue. After all, what 
harm is incurred by the application of excess tests, besides a bit of 
inefficiency? As it turns out, trademark territoriality is not just beset with 
redundancy; it actively undermines what it seeks to protect. When trademark 
rights are limited to geographic areas where the owner presently operates, 
then it is possible that consumers outside that area will be confused. Consider 
consumers who are exposed to a mark on the Internet or consumers who are 
familiar with a company’s mark in one area and travel to a remote area where 
a different company uses the mark. In the modern age, fixating on geographic 
proximity leaves these entire groups of consumers, Internet users, and 
travelers unprotected from confusingly similar marks—and such consumers 
are hardly a minority. Thus, it is a mistake to condition trademark rights on 
geographic proximity. Instead, the likelihood of confusion analysis must be 
the end-all-be-all. If consumers in an area are likely to be confused, then the 
first to use the mark should have trademark rights in that area, whether or 
not they actually operate there. 
 
 3. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 4. See id. 
 5. All Video, Inc. v. Hollywood Entm’t. Corp., 929 F. Supp. 262, 266 (E.D. Mich. 1996).  
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Part I of this paper lays out the doctrinal background of territoriality and 
trademark law, focusing on the similarities and differences between common 
law and federal statutory law. Then, Part II sets out to show that confusion 
underlies trademark territoriality both at common law and under the Lanham 
Act. With this demonstrated, Part III illustrates the pitfalls of conceptualizing 
territoriality as separate from the concern of confusion, specifically with 
regards to the Internet and mass travel. Because of this, Part IV offers a 
simple solution that merges the likelihood of confusion test with the 
traditional territoriality doctrine. 
I. TERRITORIALITY IN TRADEMARK LAW 
A. Concurrent Use at Common Law 
In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, the Supreme Court created a 
seemingly simple rule: trademark rights are obtained only through use.6 In 
other words, merely conceiving of a mark is insufficient to grant someone a 
legal right to that mark. If one is to acquire trademark rights, she must be the 
“first to use a mark on a product or service.”7 Simple enough. But, as the 
Ninth Circuit has aptly noted, things get a bit more complicated “when to 
time we add considerations of place.”8 In United Drug Co. v. Theodore 
Rectanus, the Supreme Court added that one must not just be the first in time 
to use a mark, but she must also be the first to use the mark in a specific 
place.9 The principles from Hanover Star and Theodore Rectanus form the 
basis for the common law concurrent use doctrine: similar marks may be 
used in remote geographic areas by good faith users, and if the area of use 
overlaps, exclusive rights belong to the first user.10 Thus, for a junior user to 
adopt a mark similar to that of a senior user, the junior must show that her 
use is (1) remote, and (2) in good faith. For our purposes, the requirement of 
good faith will be discussed later in this paper, and remoteness will be the 
focus of this section. 
 
 6. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916). 
 7. Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 8. Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 9. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918). 
 10. See id. This is also called the “Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine,” but in this paper it will exclusively 
be referred to as the “concurrent use doctrine.” 
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Remoteness is determined in one of two ways. First, trademark rights 
are typically limited to a mark’s “zone of actual goodwill.”11 Second, even 
if a mark has no actual goodwill in an area, courts have found that trademark 
rights extend to a “zone of natural expansion.”12 
1. Zone of Actual Goodwill 
The zone of actual goodwill is divided into two categories: the mark’s 
zone of market penetration and zone of reputation.13 The zone of market 
penetration is the most common indicator of actual goodwill. This zone is 
equivalent to all areas where the mark holder does a sufficient amount of 
business. In Sweetarts v. Sunline, the Eighth Circuit devised one of the earlier 
tests to determine the scope of market.14 This test instructed courts to weigh 
the following factors (1) total dollar value of plaintiff’s sales in the market; 
(2) number of actual customers in relation to the region’s population; (3) 
sales growth, both relative and potential; and (4) length of time since 
significant sales. 15  The Third Circuit reshaped these factors in Natural 
Footwear Ltd. v. Hart to create its own test for market penetration.16 This 
test involves weighing the following factors (1) amount of sales involving 
the trademark; (2) positive and negative growth trends in the geographical 
area; (3) number of purchasing customers in relation to the total number of 
potential customers; and (4) amount of advertising in the geographical area.17 
Multiple other circuits have embraced the Natural Footwear factors, and 
thus this test is the more common of the two.18 If a mark holder passes this 
balancing test, then she is deemed to have “penetrated” the market such that 
she has made actual use there. 
In contrast, the zone of reputation exists in all geographical regions 
where the mark is merely recognized, regardless of whether the mark holder 
 
 11. See Thomas F. Cotter, Owning What Doesn’t Exist, Where It Doesn’t Exist: Rethinking Two 
Doctrines from the Common Law of Trademarks, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 487, 492 (1995).  
 12. Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 13. See id. One scholar has suggested that this distinction is artificial because both tests purport to 
measure “consumer recognition.” See William J. Gross, The Territorial Scope of Trademark Rights, 44 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1075, 1110–12 (1990).  
 14. 380 F.2d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398–99 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., Allard Enters. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 1995); Spartan, 813 F.2d at 1283. 
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has made actual use there.19 An early illustration of the zone of reputation is 
found in Stork Restaurant v. Sahati.20 In Stork, the appellant owned and 
operated a night club in New York called THE STORK CLUB, which had 
reached nationwide fame due to widescale advertising and media presence.21 
After the New York club had been in operation for sixteen years, the 
appellees opened its bar in San Francisco under the name THE STORK 
CLUB.22 The trial court refused to issue an injunction, but the Ninth Circuit 
found that “mere geographical distance is not of itself sufficient to preclude 
the possibility that a given establishment is a branch of an enterprise having 
its principal place of business elsewhere.”23 Because of this, the court of 
appeals remanded the case with directions to the trial court to grant the 
injunction.24 Therefore, although the two marks were used across the country 
from one another, these uses were certainly not “remote” in the sense of 
concurrent use under Theodore Rectanus.25  The zone of reputation thus 
aligns with the central thrust of this paper: two marks can confuse consumers 
despite geographical distance. 
2. Zone of Natural Expansion 
As the name of this doctrine implies, some courts extend the rights of 
trademark owners to areas where the use of the mark might “naturally 
expand.”26  Different courts use different factors to determine whether a 
geographic territory is within this zone. A popular test devised by the Court 
 
 19. See Shontavia Johnson, Trademark Territoriality in Cyberspace: An Internet Framework for 
Common-Law Trademarks, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1253, 1260 (2015) (“Where the zone of actual 
market penetration is limited, the zone of reputation encompasses areas where consumers recognize the 
products using the trademark but are not direct consumers of those products.”); see also W. Scott 
Creasman, Establishing Geographic Rights in Trademarks Based on Internet Use, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 
1016, 1018 (2005) (“The zone of reputation includes areas where consumers are aware of the seller’s 
goods, but have not purchased them.”).  
 20. Stork Rest., Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 358 (9th Cir. 1948). 
 21. Id. at 350–51. 
 22. Id. at 351. 
 23. Id. at 358. 
 24. Id. at 364. It is important to note that this injunction would likely not be issued in the Ninth 
Circuit today due to the Dawn Donut rule. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 
358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959) (“[I]f the use of the marks by the registrant and the unauthorized user are confined 
to two sufficiently distinct and geographically separate markets, with no likelihood that the registrant will 
expand his use into defendant’s market, so that no public confusion is possible, then the registrant is not 
entitled to enjoin the junior user’s use of the mark.”). For further discussion of Dawn Donut, see infra 
Part I.B.2. 
 25. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26:17 
(5th ed. 2017). 
 26. Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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of Customs and Patent Appeals (now the Federal Circuit) looks to (1) 
“previous business activity;” (2) “previous expansion or lack thereof;” (3) 
“dominance of contiguous areas;” (4) “presently-planned expansion;” and 
(5) “possible market penetration by means of products brought in from other 
areas.”27 The Eleventh Circuit looks to similar factors.28 Other courts have 
foregone the multi-factor tests for a more fact-specific inquiry. 29 
Nevertheless, under any analysis, most circuits tend to use a few recurring 
factors: the history of expansions, the size of the business, and the amount of 
business activity in the contested area. These are concrete pieces of evidence 
to which the mark holder must point; she cannot simply refer to her 
aspirations of expansion.30 But if a mark holder can adequately demonstrate 
a zone of natural expansion, then she can acquire trademark rights before 
making actual use in an area. 
B. Territoriality and the Lanham Act 
Territoriality also plays a misguided role under the all-encompassing 
Lanham Act, which governs the federal trademark registration process. The 
Lanham Act took effect on July 5, 1947.31 In 2016, there were over two 
million registered trademarks in the United States. 32  Although it is 
impossible to accurately quantify the number of common law trademarks in 
the United States, it is probably safe to assume that trademarks registered 
 
 27. Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 523 (C.C.P.A. 1980). This test has been 
adopted by the Third and Fourth Circuits. See Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th 
Cir. 1987); see also Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 28. Tally-Ho, 889 F.2d at 1028 (looking to (1) the geographical distance from the user’s actual 
location to the perimeter of the zone of expansion; (2) the nature of the business and the size of the zone 
of market penetration/reputation; (3) the history of the user’s past expansion, i.e. whether it has remained 
static or has continued to expand into new areas, and based on this, the length of time it would take the 
user to reach the periphery of the expansion zone; and (4) whether it would require an unusual leap for 
the user to enter the zone, or instead whether the zone is close enough to existing locations that expansion 
is a logical extension as those previously made). 
 29. The Value House v. Phillips Mercantile Co., 523 F.2d 424, 431 (10th Cir. 1975) (looking at the 
history of expansion and business activity in the contested area); Shoppers Fair of Ark., Inc. v. Sanders 
Co., 328 F.2d 496, 500–01 (8th Cir. 1964) (focusing on the location of current stores and testimony 
regarding planned expansions); Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Brewer, 244 F. Supp. 293, 298–99 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1965) (analyzing the “growth, size and location” of the business generally and the amount of 
activity in at the contested area). 
 30. Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 731 F.2d 415, 422 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(“In the instant case, [the plaintiff] produced no credible evidence that it took similar affirmative steps or 
ever entertained realistic plans of expansion beyond its primary trade area.”). 
 31. Sondra Levine, Part One: The Common Law, the States, and Historical Perspective: The 
Origins of the Lanham Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 22, 27 (2010). 
 32. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
INDICATORS, at 131 (2017). 
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under the Lanham Act comprise the lion’s share of trademarks in the United 
States. 
1. An Age of Federal Registrations 
The Lanham Act grants the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) the 
authority to issue concurrent use registrations to different parties so long as 
the Director of the PTO determines that “confusion, mistake, or deception is 
not likely to result from the continued use” by multiple parties.33 When a 
concurrent registration is issued, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(“TTAB”) creates conditions and limitations regarding the mode or place of 
use. 34  Registration under the Lanham Act confers upon the registrant 
nationwide trademark rights based on “constructive use,” regardless of 
where the registrant actually uses the mark.35 Furthermore, registration of a 
mark on the principal register provides “constructive notice” of the 
registrant’s ownership.36 So, a junior user under the Lanham Act cannot 
invoke the concurrent use doctrine because her use is neither remote nor in 
good faith. 37  Nevertheless, a party who has used the mark before the 
registration can still retain her trademark rights. 38  To do so, Section 
1115(b)(5) of the Lanham Act requires a party to show that she adopted the 
mark before the registration, without knowledge of the registrant’s prior use, 
and that she has continuously used the mark in a specified area.39 Upon such 
a showing, this prior user is “frozen” to its area of use prior to the federal 
registration. 
At first glance, the prior user’s ability to continue using her mark in the 
face of registration seems to be a codification of the common law concurrent 
 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2016). 
 34. See Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Proving Ownership Online . . . And Keeping It: 
The Internet’s Impact on Trademark Use and Coexistence, 104 TRADEMARK REP. 1275, 1304–05 (2014) 
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2014); TMEP § 1506 (5th ed. Sept. 2007); TBMP § 1101.01 (3d ed. Rev. 2, 
June 2013)). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2018). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2018). 
 37. See MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at § 26:38 (“But in many situations, it will be the ‘constructive 
use’ date of application that will govern and decide a territorial priority battle. [§1057(c)] constructively 
puts the registrant ‘there’ as if it had actually commenced a commercial level of sales nationwide as of 
the application date.”); see also Foxtrap, Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671 F.2d 636, 640 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(“By providing that registration constitutes constructive notice of the registrant’s rights, the Lanham Act 
removed the good faith element in the Tea Rose-Rectanus defense.” (citing Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s 
Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1959))). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c)(1) (2018). 
 39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (2018); see also Foxtrap, 671 F.2d at 640. 
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use doctrine.40 Yet, Professor McCarthy has pointed out that there exists no 
remoteness requirement in Section 1115(b)(5), unlike the concurrent use 
doctrine.41 This absence has created somewhat of a circuit split. The Ninth 
Circuit has held that Section 1115(b)(5) has no remoteness requirement, and 
if one is to be added, that is a job for Congress.42 The Sixth Circuit, on the 
other hand, has read the remoteness requirement from the common law into 
the limited area defense.43 Given this disagreement, it would be hasty to 
interpret Section 1115(b)(5) as a perfect codification of the concurrent use 
doctrine. Thus, for our purposes, we will treat them as distinct doctrines. 
As far as remedies go, the Lanham Act confers upon the registrant the 
right to a civil cause of action against an infringer44 and further entitles her 
to injunctive relief. 45  However, the mere act of infringement does not 
necessarily grant the registrant the right to enjoin the infringing use. The 
following section will detail the territorial limits of the injunction. 
2. Injunctions and the Dawn Donut Rule 
In 1959, the Second Circuit created a rule that seemed to flow naturally 
from the concurrent use doctrine: plaintiffs cannot enjoin remote users from 
using the plaintiff’s mark.46 Starting in June of 1922, the eponymous plaintiff 
in Dawn Donut adopted the mark DAWN DONUT to use in connection with 
the sale of donut mix.47 Dawn Donut was a Michigan-based company that 
sold its mix to buyers in several states across the country, including New 
York. 48  The defendant, Hart Food Stores, owned and operated a retail 
grocery chain within several New York counties.49 In 1951, Hart Food began 
to use the mark DAWN in connection with the sale of baked goods within a 
forty-five mile radius of Rochester, New York.50 The district court found that 
Hart Food had adopted the mark in good faith and without actual knowledge 
 
 40. I have labeled this a “response” instead of a defense because there is disagreement as to whether 
this is a defense on the merits or whether it simply eliminates the benefits of incontestability. See Gross, 
supra note 12, at 1095–96 n.112. 
 41. MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at § 26:48. 
 42. Quiksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 762 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 43. Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1124 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)–(b) (2018). 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2018). 
 46. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 47. Id. at 361. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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of the plaintiff’s use.51 But because the plaintiff had federally registered its 
mark in 1927, when the Lanham Act came into effect on July 5, 1947, the 
defendant was held to have constructive notice of the mark.52 As such, the 
defendant was unable to claim that it was engaged in good faith use. Thus, it 
looked like the plaintiff had won. After all, the concurrent use defense is 
inapplicable without good faith. Yet, this did not end the inquiry. 
The court ultimately concluded that a senior user is not entitled to enjoin 
a junior user if the two users “are confined to two sufficiently distinct and 
geographically separate markets, with no likelihood that the registrant will 
expand his use into defendant’s market, so that no public confusion is 
possible.”53 In the case at hand, the district court found that since 1927, 
Dawn Donut had not licensed its mark in connection with the sale of donuts 
within sixty miles of Hart Food’s trading area.54 Furthermore, although the 
plaintiff had made sales to bakers in Rochester, none of the purchasers sold 
donuts in connection with the plaintiff’s mark.55 As such, the district court 
concluded that Dawn Donut neither used its mark in the defendant’s trading 
area nor had any intent to expand the use of its mark to the area.56 The Second 
Circuit, therefore, held that Dawn Donut and the defendant used their marks 
in “distinct and separate markets,” and because of this, Dawn Donut could 
not enjoin the defendant’s use.57 
Dawn Donut has gained popularity across circuits, and courts tend to 
apply the doctrine in roughly the same way: to acquire injunctive relief, the 
plaintiff must either have entered the geographical area of the defendant or 
have plans to expand there.58 Unlike the concurrent use doctrine, good faith 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 362 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1072 (1947)). 
 53. Id. at 364. 
 54. Id. at 361. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 364–65. 
 57. Id. at 365. The plaintiff was not forever foreclosed from injunctive relief, however. The court 
added that Dawn Donut would be entitled to an injunction “upon a proper showing of an intent to use the 
mark at the retail level in defendant’s market area . . .” Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 931–32 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (“[A] court will enjoin the junior user only if the registrant is likely to enter, or has entered, 
the junior user’s trade territory.”); Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 
1246 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[T]o enjoin a geographically remote infringer, the registered owner must prove 
that its trademarked products and the infringing products are being sold in the same geographic area, or 
that the owner has concrete plans to expand into the infringer’s trade area.”); Union Nat’l Bank v. Union 
Nat’l Bank, 909 F.2d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 1990) (“A senior user may not exclude others in areas where he 
does not currently do business nor is likely to do business in the future.” (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d 
at 364–65)); Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 1969) (“[W]here a 
federal registrant has expanded its business to the point that the use of the conflictingly similar marks by 
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plays no role here due to constructive notice.59 After Dawn Donut, courts 
tend to enjoin only based on actual use or an intent to expand. Thus, the 
Dawn Donut rule only concerns the plaintiff’s zone of market penetration or 
zone of natural expansion, not her zone of reputation. 
II. THE ROLE OF CONFUSION 
The previous section detailed the doctrinal background of trademark 
territoriality, both at common law and under federal law. This is not the 
whole story, however. As indicated in the introduction, there is a common 
theme underlying all territoriality doctrine: confusion. As Dan Burk has 
argued, a junior user’s claim of territorial rights in an area is roughly 
equivalent to a claim that consumers in that area are not likely to be 
confused.60 In other words, because territorial rights are entirely premised on 
a lack of confusion, it is nonsensical to claim that consumers in an area are 
likely to confuse a senior and junior users’ marks, and also conclude that the 
senior user has no territorial rights there. But a court that rigidly applies the 
zone of market penetration or expansion tests, and does not use the zone of 
reputation test, could fail to issue an injunction in an area where the senior 
user has a reputation without a physical presence. After all, Dawn Donut is 
entirely premised on actual use or expansion. 
This section will show that trademark territoriality is grounded in an 
outdated notion of consumer awareness. It begins by looking at the reasoning 
courts employ when drawing territorial boundaries at common law. Then, it 
will look at courts’ justification for the use of Dawn Donut under the Lanham 
Act. By looking at both territorial doctrines, this section will show that courts 
in both areas seem to be motivated almost entirely by consumer confusion. 
 
the registrant and the unauthorized user are no longer confined to separate and distinct market areas and 
there is established the likelihood of public confusion, the federal registrant is entitled under the authority 
of the Lanham Act to injunctive relief.” (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 365)). 
 59. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 362 (“[B]y eliminating the defense of good faith and lack of 
knowledge, § 1072 affords nationwide protection to registered marks, regardless of the areas in which the 
registrant actually uses the mark.”); see also Koffler Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 434 F. 
Supp. 697, 702 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (“Once registration is effected, no subsequent adoption and use of the 
same or a similar mark for the same or similar goods can be justified on a claim of good faith.”). 
 60. Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 711 
(1998) (“One might say that territorially separated concurrent users of a mark have developed rights 
within distinct areas, or that the consumers in the distinct areas are unlikely to become confused, but the 
statements are largely equivalent.”). 
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A. Consumer Awareness at Common Law 
First, return to the concurrent use doctrine. Even in Theodore Rectanus, 
which created the concurrent use doctrine, the reasoning of the Court 
suggests that the underlying concern was confusion. There, the Court stated 
that two marks are remote if a mark “means one thing in one market, [and] 
an entirely different thing in another.”61 The Court added that trademark law 
prevents two non-remote entities from making use of the same mark because 
of how “purchasers have come to understand the mark.” 62  The Court’s 
concern is clear: an individual cannot start using a mark similar to another 
mark in an area when consumers have come to understand the first mark in 
a certain way. If a junior user employs a mark with which consumers have 
already developed an association, then the Supreme Court would not deem 
this use “remote.” This reasoning has led Professor McCarthy to remark that 
remoteness at common law is not about geographical distance, but is instead 
about the “territorial dimension of likelihood of confusion.”63 
Even though territory is linked to confusion, the classic remoteness 
doctrine tends to treat geographical distance and consumer awareness 
distinctly. Think back to the zone of actual goodwill, which is divided into 
two subcategories: market penetration and reputation. The former is 
concerned with geographic remoteness, and the latter is concerned with 
consumer awareness. If Professor McCarthy is correct (which I believe he 
is), then market penetration is redundant; reputation is all that matters. But 
caselaw has gone the opposite way. In practice, it is uncommon for courts to 
use the zone of reputation in their territory analysis. Some courts have 
recognized it,64 but many circuit courts have found that market penetration 
 
 61. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918). 
 62. Id. 
 63. MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at § 26:4. 
 64. E.g., Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1124 (6th Cir. 
1996) (“[M]ere geographical distance is not controlling where the reputation of the senior user’s mark 
has been carried into a trade area prior to the junior user’s adoption and use.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 22, at § 26.06)); Peaches Entm’t Corp. v. Entm’t Repertoire 
Assocs., 62 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The junior user may establish his trade territory by identifying 
the ‘zone of reputation’ acquired for his mark.”); Sunearth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., No. C 11-
4991 CW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120439, at *38 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013) (recognizing that territorial 
rights can stem from reputation without sales); Glow Indus. v. Lopez, 252 F. Supp. 2d 962, 983 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002) (“Where the trademark user has acquired a national reputation associated with its mark, it may 
assert trademark rights even in areas where it has no sales.”); Laurel Capital Grp., Inc. v. BT Fin. Corp., 
45 F. Supp. 2d 469, 492 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (“Rights in a mark can extend beyond the geographic area of 
actual sales and customer residences if the user’s reputation is carried via word of mouth and 
advertisements.”); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesar’s Palace, 490 F. Supp. 818, 827 (D.N.J. 1980) 
(“[G]eographic distance between parties will not preclude a finding of infringement or unfair competition 
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alone determines remoteness.65 Along these lines, some trademark scholars 
have suggested that the zone of reputation should entirely give way to the 
zone of penetration in determining actual goodwill,66 or that the zone of 
reputation should merely be a factor among many.67 
This development would seem to suggest that Professor McCarthy and 
I are wrong in claiming that remoteness is about consumer awareness and 
not geography. Yet, upon closer inspection, courts commonly invoke market 
penetration while simultaneously grounding their inquiry in consumer 
awareness. Take, for example, the case of Accu Personnel, Inc. v. Accustaff, 
Inc. from the District of Delaware.68 In Accu Personnel, the court held that 
concurrent use requires geographical remoteness, and thus neither party can 
penetrate the market of the other if concurrent use applies.69 This holding 
was a straightforward application of the zone of market penetration, and 
perhaps the analysis could have ended there. However, the court went on to 
find that the trademark owner must establish market penetration sufficient to 
pose a likelihood of confusion.70 So, despite the court’s focus on actual 
market penetration, it appears that the underlying concern of the court was 
truly consumer confusion, not just the use in a geographical region. After all, 
if the court applied remoteness in its literal geographic sense, then any 
 
based upon a likelihood of confusion.”); Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 437 F. Supp. 956, 962 (N.D. Cal. 
1977) (issuing a nationwide injunction despite plaintiff’s solely local use because of nationwide 
reputation); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Roberts, 388 F. Supp. 1383, 1387 (D.S.C. 1974) (“Although there 
is some evidence that the two restaurants do appeal to the same north-south tourist traffic, direct or market 
competition is not an essential ingredient of unfair competition; and plaintiffs need not establish 
competition in the same market.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(“[E]ven though the senior user of an unregistered mark has established priority over a junior user through 
prior appropriation, injunctive relief is appropriate only in those areas where the senior user can show 
sufficient actual use.”); Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, 
Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) (“To be entitled to injunctive relief against [the defendant’s] 
subsequent good faith use, [the plaintiff] must prove that its prior use of the mark penetrated the 
geographic market in question.”); GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 542 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding 
that the use was remote because the plaintiff had never operated subsidiaries in the area, sold products or 
provided services in the area, nor advertised in the area); Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 
760 F.2d 1383, 1394 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he senior user of a common law mark may not be able to obtain 
relief against the junior user in an area where it has no established trade, and hence no reputation and no 
good will.”). 
 66. Gross, supra note 12, at 1086 (“[T]rademark protection should not extend beyond the area of 
actual market penetration.”). 
 67. Brian L. Berlandi, What State Am I In?: Common Law Trademarks on the Internet, 4 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 105, 111 (1998) (“In most instances . . . the ‘Zone of Reputation’ will not 
be the sole determinative factor.”). 
 68. 846 F. Supp. 1191, 1205–06 (D. Del. 1994). 
 69. Id. at 1205. 
 70. Id. at 1206 (citing Nat. Footwear, 760 F.2d at 1397). 
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amount of market penetration would render two marks non-remote. 
However, the conclusion in Accu Personnel was not that simple. Instead, 
remoteness fades when consumers are sufficiently aware of both marks, or 
as the Supreme Court said, the marks no longer “mean one thing in one 
market” and “an entirely different thing in another.”71 Thus, although the 
inquiry seemed initially to be framed around geographic penetration, the 
separation between remoteness and confusion is merely illusory. 
The court in Accu Personnel is not the only court to claim it is using 
one test of remoteness when in fact it is using another. In National Ass’n for 
Healthcare Communities v. Central Arkansas Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 
the Eighth Circuit claimed to be focusing its remoteness inquiry on actual, 
physical market penetration.72 Yet, in so doing, the court emphasized that the 
market penetration “must be significant enough to pose the real likelihood of 
confusion among the consumers” in the specified area.73 Moreover, when 
applied to the facts at hand, the court determined that the plaintiff had not 
shown a likelihood of confusion in the defendant’s area of use, and thus the 
plaintiff had not penetrated that territory.74 Like the district court in Accu 
Personnel, the Eighth Circuit seems to understand market penetration to both 
mean penetration based on sales and penetration based on consumer 
awareness. By analyzing remoteness in this way, these courts have taken a 
subtle approach to ground the remoteness inquiry in confusion. 
That being said, some courts explicitly define remoteness as an 
assessment of consumer awareness. 75  Both the Eastern and Southern 
Districts of New York are prominent examples.76 In Tuccillo v. Geisha NYC, 
LLC, Judge Bianco held that a geographically remote location is defined “as 
 
 71. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918). 
 72. 257 F.3d 732, 735–36 (8th Cir. 2001).  
 73. Id. (citing Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967)). 
 74. Id. at 736. 
 75. See, e.g., Baskim Holdings, Inc. v. Two M, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-01898-APG-GWF, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 156752, at *9–10 (D. Nev. Sept. 25, 2017) (defining remoteness as use in an area where it 
is unlikely that consumers would be confused by the second user’s use of the mark) (citing Grupo Gigante 
S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2004)); Zuppardi’s Apizza, Inc. v. Tony 
Zuppardi’s Apizza, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-01363 (RNC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136763, at *31 (D. Conn. 
Sept. 29, 2014) (“Remoteness, under Tea-Rose Rectanus, is a question not of geographic distance but of 
a mark’s strength.”); Hispanic Broad. Corp. v. Educ. Media Found., No. CV-02-7134 CAS (AJWx), 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24804, at *21–22 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2003). 
 76. See Tuccillo v. Geisha NYC, LLC, 635 F. Supp. 2d 227, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A] senior user 
cannot enjoin a junior user’s use of a mark if the junior user can prove that it . . . first used the mark in a 
geographically remote location, defined as an area in which the senior user’s mark was not known such 
that there would be confusion as to source . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine 
Made Simple, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 60, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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an area in which the senior user’s mark was not known such that there would 
be confusion as to source.” Similarly, in Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made 
Simple, Inc., Judge Sweet used Theodore Rectanus to support his assertion 
that remoteness is a use in “an area where the senior user’s mark was not 
known such that there could be confusion as to source.”77 The Fourth Circuit 
has embraced this interpretation of Theodore Rectanus and has endorsed this 
notion of remoteness.78 To be sure, not all courts agree that geography and 
consumer awareness are two sides of the same coin.79 Nevertheless, as these 
examples show, there are notable instances of courts openly embracing the 
confusion-based model of remoteness. 
In sum, although some courts may be less than clear about the role of 
confusion in concurrent use at common law, there are plenty of examples 
that demonstrate courts generally recognize the interplay of remoteness and 
confusion. Although some courts reject this overlap, this paper is making a 
normative assertion, as well as a descriptive one: not only are consumer 
confusion and territoriality actually intertwined, but also, the courts that 
separate the two are incorrect in doing so.80 
B. Confusion and Dawn Donut 
This mistake is not isolated to common law marks—it is pervasive 
under the Lanham Act as well. Because the Lanham Act grants mark holders 
nationwide constructive use, territoriality under federal law most commonly 
comes into play when courts are issuing injunctions. In other words, it is 
most relevant when Dawn Donut rears its head. Because Dawn Donut 
permits injunctions only when two marks are used in “distinct and separate 
markets,” the doctrine seems to be concerned only with geography, not 
confusion. Yet, like concurrent use at common law, this distinction is 
illusory. As before, the motivation behind Dawn Donut is consumer 
 
 77. Best Cellars, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (citing United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 
90, 100 (1918)). 
 78. Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2003) (“A use 
is geographically remote if the mark was used in an area ‘where the senior user’s mark was not known 
such that there could be confusion as to source.’” (citing Best Cellars, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 84)). 
 79. See Diamonds Direct USA, Inc. v. BFJ Holdings, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 2d 752, 759 (E.D. Va. 2012) 
(“Well-established precedent limits the geographic scope of trademark protection ‘to the locality where 
the mark is used and to the area of probable expansion.’” (citing Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 
F.2d 1279, 1282 (4th Cir. 1987))); see also Laurel Capital Grp., Inc. v. BT Fin. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d 
469, 482 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (“Once the court identifies a situation wherein the junior user actually possesses 
superior rights in the relevant market area, the final issue is whether the ‘second comer’s’ actions cause 
a likelihood of confusion.”). 
 80. See infra Section III. 
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confusion, not geographical penetration. This motivation is readily found in 
the case of Dawn Donut and in the cases that have followed. 
In Dawn Donut, the court justified its decision by remarking that “no 
public confusion is likely” so long as the plaintiff and defendant confined 
their uses of the mark “Dawn” to separate trading areas.81 And if this was not 
clear enough, the court explicitly held that when the use is confined to 
distinct and separate markets, with no likelihood of expansion, “there is no 
likelihood of public confusion arising from the concurrent use of the marks 
and therefore the issuance of an injunction is not warranted.”82 Thus, the 
court tied the denial of injunctive relief directly to the fact that there was no 
likelihood of confusion. If there was a likelihood of confusion, it is doubtful 
that the court would have denied the injunction. As such, this was not a case 
about geography; it was a case about consumer awareness. At the time Dawn 
Donut was decided, distance was often a proxy for awareness. 
This is evidenced by the fact that many courts have read Dawn Donut 
to be a doctrine about consumer confusion.83 At least three circuit courts 
have made claims to this effect. First, while discussing the Dawn Donut rule, 
the Fifth Circuit held that a user cannot not enjoin another if “the likelihood 
of confusion between his product and the infringer’s is minimal or non-
existent, such as where the parties to the action use the mark in totally 
different markets, or for different products.”84 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit 
had held that Dawn Donut requires injunctive relief to be contingent upon a 
 
 81. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 82. Id. at 365. 
 83. See, e.g., Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1246 n. 7 (8th Cir. 
1994); Am. Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1963); Taza Sys., LLC v. Taza 
21 Co., LLC, No. 2:11cv073, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130974, at *24–25 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2013) 
(“[B]ecause these third parties use their marks in geographically ‘separate trading areas’ and there is no 
evidence that Taza Systems had imminent plans to expand into the third-party user’s territory, no public 
confusion [is] likely.” (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d 358)); Johnson v. Sosebee, 397 F. Supp. 2d 706, 
709 (D.S.C. 2005) (“The right that the federal registrant obtains over common law rights is the right to 
enjoin the junior user when there is a likelihood of confusion created by a likelihood of entry.” (citing 
McCarthy, supra note 22, at § 26:33)); Shells Seafood Rests., Inc. v. Atari, No. 1:96cv276-C, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 11157, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 4, 1997) (“Where geographic separation in use of the mark 
prevents likelihood of confusion, an infringement claim will not be viable.” (citing Dawn Donut, 267 
F.2d); Cent. Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l Bank of Wash., No. 1253-73, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16434, at 
*14 (D.D.C. Jan. 1, 1975) (“Where there is no present likelihood that plaintiff will expand its use into 
defendant’s territorial market place, as is the case here, and where the unauthorized use of a conflicting 
mark is confined to a sufficiently distinct and geographically separate market by the junior user, there 
may be no present likelihood of public confusion.” (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364)). 
 84. Union Nat’l Bank v. Union Nat’l Bank, 909 F.2d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Golden 
Flake, 312 F.2d at 626 (stating that Dawn Donut is premised “on the necessity of showing likelihood of 
confusion.”). 
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“present likelihood of confusion.”85 Finally, the Ninth Circuit invoked Dawn 
Donut to affirm the denial of an injunction only because it found that there 
was no likelihood of confusion.86 However, the court indicated that it would 
not deny an injunction if the plaintiff could show a “likelihood of public 
confusion,” despite the geographic distance between the two uses.87 Thus, in 
all three cases, the courts applied Dawn Donut with an eye to consumer 
confusion. 
Of course, this might indicate that there is no issue to be resolved and 
that this paper is useless. After all, if courts are conditioning injunctive relief 
on confusion, then the doctrine appears to recognize the geography-
confusion overlap and thus does not need a fix. However, courts applying 
Dawn Donut often forget that confusion is the underlying concern and 
instead rigidly apply the geographic rule handed down when the doctrine 
was created. For example, see the case of Johnson v. Sosebee.88 There, the 
court did discuss confusion in the context of an injunction, but ultimately 
concluded that “there is no likely confusion for a court to enjoin unless and 
until the senior user shows a likelihood of entry into the junior user’s trade 
territory.”89 Thus, the court refused to protect a trademark in areas that the 
plaintiff had not actually penetrated, or was likely to penetrate, even if the 
plaintiff had acquired a reputation in that area without a physical presence.90 
Some courts do not believe that is a risk in the rigid application of Dawn 
Donut because they do not think that consumer confusion is possible in 
geographically distinct markets. 91  But this assumption seems unlikely, 
 
 85. Minn. Pet Breeders, 41 F.3d at 1246 (“[T]he nationwide right conferred by registration does not 
entitle the owner to injunctive relief unless there is a present likelihood of confusion.” (citing Dawn 
Donut, 267 F.2d at 358)); see also Comidas Exquisitos, Inc. v. O’Malley & McGee’s, Inc., 775 F.2d 260, 
262 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief when the defendant used the mark in 
a distinct geographic region because there was no risk of public confusion). 
 86. Continente v. Continente, 378 F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir. 1967). 
 87. See id. (“Since there is nothing in the record before us to indicate that plaintiff’s trade may 
reasonably be expected to expand into the British Columbia area, and there is nothing in the record to 
demonstrate the likelihood of public confusion arising from the present use, by defendant, of his mark in 
British Columbia . . . plaintiff is not now entitled to any relief under the Lanham Act.”). 
 88. Johnson, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 709. 
 89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting What-A-Burger of Va., Inc. v. Whataburger, 
Inc., 357 F.3d 441, 451 (4th Cir. 2004)). 
 90. Id. at 710–11. 
 91. See, e.g., Kerzner Int’l, Inc. v. Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1047 (D. 
Nev. 2009) (stating that the Dawn Donut is based on a belief that no consumer confusion is possible in 
geographically distinct markets, but noting that the Ninth Circuit has held otherwise in applying its 
famous marks doctrine (citing Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 
2004))); Commerce Bancorp, Inc. v. BankAtlantic, 285 F. Supp. 2d 475, 501 n.12 (D.N.J. 2003) (“ . . .  
there can be no likelihood of confusion until two products are marketed on the same territory.”). 
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especially in light of the Internet and mass travel. Perhaps it is this 
conception of Dawn Donut that has caused the Sixth Circuit to reject the 
doctrine entirely and focus its inquiry solely on consumer confusion.92 In the 
Sixth Circuit, a plaintiff need only show likelihood of confusion in a 
particular area to enjoin the defendant’s use there, regardless of whether the 
plaintiff has actually made use of the mark in that territory.93 Concurring in 
the opinion, Judge Jones argued that the mobility of modern society coupled 
with the Internet has eroded geographical barriers and rendered Dawn Donut 
irrelevant.94 And just a few years later, the court reiterated that when a court 
is determining territorial rights, it should rely on the underlying goal of 
eliminating consumer confusion.95  Over a decade later, the First Circuit 
appeared to support this view in Dorpan S.L. v. Hotel Meliá, Inc. 96  In 
Dorpan, the First Circuit held that the area of a mark’s use is defined as the 
area where the mark would create a likelihood of confusion, and thus an 
inquiry of geographic scope and an inquiry of confusion are “one and the 
same.”97 
Despite these steps in the right direction, plenty of courts continue to 
separate geographic from consumer awareness. The next section will discuss 
the problems that arise when geographic distance is taken as an end-all-be-
all and is separated from a confusion inquiry. 
III. WHEN CONFUSION IS FORGOTTEN 
There are actual harms imposed on consumers when courts ignore the 
geography-confusion synthesis: consumers are likely to be confused. At first 
glance, this may seem like a circular argument. After all, it would be 
fallacious to argue that confusion is vital for the sole reason that ignoring 
confusion will cause confusion. But there is an important distinction that 
must be made. Whether or not one accepts the premise that confusion 
underlies territoriality, it is widely accepted that one of the broader goals of 
 
 92. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A] court need 
only find that a defendant is liable for infringement or unfair competition for it to award injunctive 
relief.”). 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. at 1057 (Jones, J., concurring). 
 95. Allard Enters. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 96. Dorpan, S.L. v. Hotel Meliá, Inc., 728 F.3d 55, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 97. Id. (“[T]he geographic area in which an unregistered trademark is ‘in use’ is defined as the area 
in which the use of similar mark would create a likelihood of confusion . . . . Thus, in this case, the inquiry 
into the geographic scope of [the plaintiff’s] pre-existing common law trademark rights and the likelihood 
of confusion analysis are one and the same.”). 
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trademark law as a whole is to prevent consumer confusion.98 Because of 
this, if a doctrine in trademark law increases the chance of confusion, then 
this would seem to frustrate the very goals of trademark law itself. This 
section will attempt to show that a trademark territoriality doctrine detached 
from confusion will frustrate a broader purpose of trademark law. 
A. The Non-Territorial Internet 
The First Circuit aptly noted that it was once the case that “confusingly 
similar trademarks could exist simultaneously in different geographical 
areas” without risk of consumer confusion, but the Internet “has drastically 
changed this situation.”99 That was in 2001, and the pace of change has not 
slowed. It is now typical for a company to have its website accessible from 
anywhere in the country. And in addition to having websites, companies are 
on Facebook, Twitter, Yelp, Groupon, Seamless, and so on. The First Circuit 
may have been concerned about individual websites, but consumer 
interaction with trademarks has moved far beyond a company’s website. 
Consider the case of a junior user operating a restaurant with a name 
identical to a senior user’s restaurant in a geographically remote location. If 
the senior mark is unregistered, and the junior use is in good faith, then 
common law territoriality focusing on market penetration alone will permit 
this use. In contrast, if the senior mark is registered, then a court using the 
solely geographical Dawn Donut will prevent the senior user from enjoining 
the junior user, assuming there is no likelihood of expansion. 
Now, imagine a consumer in Portland, Oregon, who has learned about 
a restaurant named “Toro Bravo” and is considering eating dinner there. This 
consumer may look on Yelp and find that an identically named “Toro Bravo” 
in Seattle has only a two-star rating. This rating may influence the decision 
of the Portland consumer. In one study, Michael Luca has found evidence 
that ratings on Yelp have a direct effect on a restaurant’s revenue. A rating 
increase of one star appears to increase revenue by 5-9 percent.100 So, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that restaurant ratings on Yelp do influence 
 
 98. See Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The 
gravamen for any action of trademark infringement or common law unfair competition is whether the 
challenged mark is likely to cause confusion.”).  
 99. Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2001). Although the 
court was specifically referring to domain names in this case, the principle is the same. Id.  
 100. Michael Luca, Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.com 13–14 (Harv. Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 12-016, 2016), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12-
016_a7e4a5a2-03f9-490d-b093-8f951238dba2.pdf.  
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consumer decision-making. As such, there is a chance that a low-rated 
restaurant with a name identical name to the one in Portland could confuse 
the consumer and alter her purchasing decisions, although one restaurant is 
in a different city.101 The Portland consumer could fail to notice that the 
Seattle restaurant is a Seattle restaurant and not the one in Portland, or the 
Portland consumer could assume that they have the same owner and thus the 
rating of one might bear on the quality of the other. In either case, the 
Portland consumer may miss out on a good meal, and the Portland restaurant 
could miss out on a customer. Alternatively, in a mirrored state of affairs, the 
Portland consumer may pay for a lousy meal due to her confusion on Yelp. 
In the case of restaurants, courts have taken note of online uses like this 
one when assessing likelihood of confusion. One court found that the 
presence of two similar marks on Yelp was significant for the common 
“marketing channels” prong of the likelihood of confusion analysis because 
such advertising efforts were “highly probative of whether the mark creates 
a likelihood of confusion.” 102  Another court looked to a restaurant’s 
Facebook efforts for this analysis as well. 103  In addition to marketing 
channels, one court found that mistaken restaurant Yelp reviews are 
admissible evidence of actual confusion. 104  And beyond the world of 
restaurants, various courts have taken note of Internet presence in multiple 
ways in their confusion analysis, including advertising methods, actual 
confusion, intent, and marketing channels.105 Additionally, when it comes to 
 
 101. To be sure, the mere fact that a company creates a Yelp or Facebook page does not guarantee 
that consumers will create an association with the mark. But showing consumer interaction with such 
pages is good evidence of such an association. See Gilson LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 31, at 1284. 
 102. TWTB, Inc. v. Rampick, 152 F. Supp. 3d 549, 564–65 (E.D. La. 2016) (quoting Elvis Presley 
Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 197 (5th Cir. 1998)); cf. My Taco Guy, LLC v. Taco Man Corp., 
No. CV 17-1573 FMO (AJWx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212138, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2017).  
 103. Gorgeous Gals, LLC v. Hey Gorgeous! Spa & Wellness, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-903-RP, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 182401, at *18–19 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017).  
 104. You Fit, Inc. v. Pleasanton Fitness, LLC, No. 8:12-CV-1917-T-27EAJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18106, at *15–16 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2013).  
 105. See, e.g., Uber Promotions, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1270–71 (N.D. Fla. 
2016) (evidence of similar sales/advertising methods); Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Tiger Paw Distribs., 
LLC, No. CV 416-107, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81089, at *16–18 (S.D. Ga. June 22, 2016) (evidence of 
actual confusion); Teal Bay Alls., LLC v. Southbound One, Inc., No. MJG-13-2180, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 10940, at *41–42 (D. Md. Jan. 26, 2015) (evidence of similar advertising channels); Treemo, Inc. 
v. Flipboard, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1361 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (evidence of actual confusion); Wine 
& Canvas Dev. LLC v. Weisser, No. 1:11-cv-01598-TWP-DKL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113448, at *27–
28 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2014) (evidence of defendant’s intent); Nordstrom, Inc. v. Nomorerack Retail 
Grp., Inc., No. C12-1853-RSM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41810, at *22 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2013) 
(evidence of similar marketing channels); Lopez v. Gap, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 400, 421–22 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (evidence of lack of product proximity).  
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assessing secondary meaning of a mark, courts will also use Internet 
presence in various ways.106 
The presence of a Yelp or a Facebook page has often played a less 
prominent role when it comes to determining territorial rights. 107  For 
example, take the common law territory analysis in Dudley v. HealthSource 
Chiropractic, Inc., in which a court in the Western District of New York 
failed to appreciate the fact that Facebook and Google searches returned 
potentially confusing results.108 This fact was discussed in the Lanham Act 
infringement analysis, but when it came to the common law discussion, the 
court only addressed the Internet insofar as it concluded that the plaintiff 
could not have exclusive rights to Internet use.109 Thus, had the plaintiff in 
Dudley not registered its mark, the court could have foregone a likelihood of 
confusion analysis entirely after concluding that the uses were remote. This 
outcome would be unacceptable, especially because both marks were used 
on the Internet. 
In the similar case of Brothers of the Wheel M.C. Executive Council, 
Inc. v. Mollohan, a court in the Southern District of Western Virginia limited 
the scope of injunctive geographic areas actually penetrated by the plaintiff, 
in supposed accordance with Dawn Donut.110 But before discussing market 
penetration, the court noted that the defendant operated a Facebook page that 
displayed the disputed name and logo.111 Despite this, the court ultimately 
ordered that the defendant only cease use within areas physically penetrated 
by the plaintiff, ignoring all Internet use. Thus, the problem with Dudley 
 
 106. Seasalt Del Mar, LP v. Five Greeks LLC, No. 16cv00601 JAH-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
186677, at *26–28 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2017) (finding that an issue of fact had been raised regarding 
secondary meaning due to the plaintiff’s website, Facebook page, and Yelp page); Sarkis’ Cafe, Inc. v. 
Sarks in the Park, LLC, No. 12 C 9686, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22566, at *24–27 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2016) 
(finding that Yelp and Grubhub reviews raise an issue of fact as to secondary meaning); Heritage of Pride, 
Inc. v. Matinee N.Y. City, No. 14 Civ. 4165 (CM), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86495, at *49–50 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 20, 2014); GamerModz, LLC v. Golubev, No. 8:10-CV-1466-T-27TGW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
116608, at *34–35 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2011) (finding that $100,000 spent on Google AdWords established 
secondary meaning). But see Provident Precious Metals, LLC v. Nw. Terr. Mint, LLC, 117 F. Supp. 3d 
879, 899 n.55 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (finding that such evidence is inadmissible as hearsay).  
 107. E.g., Gorgeous Gals, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182401, at *22–23 (discussing only geographical 
distance in the remoteness analysis, although both parties had Yelp and Facebook pages); Lucky 13 
Unlimited, LLC v. Comly Rd. Holdings, LLC, No. 15-5946, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6643, at *13 (E.D. 
Pa. Jan. 15, 2016) (discussing the existence of Yelp pages only in the context of the confusion analysis, 
not territoriality); Bros. of the Wheel M.C. Exec. Council, Inc. v. Mollohan, 909 F. Supp. 2d 506, 520–
21 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) (limiting the injunctions to areas where the plaintiff physically operates, despite 
Facebook usage); Dudley v. HealthSource Chiropractic, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 377, 395 (W.D.N.Y. 2012).  
 108. 883 F. Supp. 2d at 395.  
 109. See id.  
 110. 909 F. Supp. 2d at 520–21. 
 111. Id. at 518.  
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plagued Mollohan as well, albeit in the context of a federally registered mark. 
In either case, an entire class of confused plaintiffs may potentially have been 
ignored due to the restricted nature of the territoriality analysis. 
This is not to say that no court considers Internet presence in its 
territoriality analysis. Consider the case of Guthrie Healthcare Systems v. 
ContextMedia in the Second Circuit.112 In Guthrie, the court reviewed a 
district court’s injunction and found that it was in error because the 
injunction permitted the defendant to continue using its mark within 
Guthrie’s service area.113 Specifically, the defendant could keep using the 
mark on the Internet. The Second Circuit reasoned that because the 
defendant’s webpages were accessible within the scope of the plaintiff’s 
geographic territory, confusion in these areas was likely.114 Yet the court did 
not determine how the injunction should be tailored to fix this problem—it 
left that to the district court on remand.115 Nevertheless, the court recognized 
the potential for a mark on the Internet mark to confuse, even without a 
physical presence.116 
In Guthrie, the court was likely influenced by the fact that the defendant 
operated near the plaintiff. After all, the court found that this geographic 
proximity supported a likelihood of confusion.117 However, at least one court 
has found that the Internet generated a likelihood of confusion despite a lack 
of geographic proximity. In Baskim Holdings, Inc. v. Two M, Inc., a court in 
the District of Nevada found a genuine issue of fact as to whether businesses 
in New Orleans and Las Vegas were actually remote.118 Even though the 
businesses were located in different cities, the court noted the identical 
names and services, coupled with the fact that both had websites and a social 
media presence. 119  Although Baskim may seem unique, the holding is 
 
 112. Guthrie Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 826 F.3d 27, 47 (2d Cir. 2016).  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 50.  
 116. In this particular case, there was a physical presence, id. at 39–40, but there is no reason to read 
the court’s holding as applying only to such cases. The concern was about Internet presence that could be 
accessed within the plaintiff’s territory; it did not rely on the defendant physically being present as well. 
Id.  
 117. Id. 
 118. No. 2:16-cv-01898-APG-GWF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156752, at *10–11 (D. Nev. Sept. 25, 
2017). 
 119. Id. For a more subtle example of Internet presence having an effect, see Boldface Licensing + 
Branding v. By Lee Tillett, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 2013). There, the court refused 
to apply Dawn Donut because, inter alia, the senior user had a large Internet presence and made sales 
across the country. Id. I call this “more subtle” because the amount of sales in the area in question seemed 
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unsurprising once one notices the court’s explicit statement that consumer 
confusion is the “touchstone” of concurrent use. 120  With this axiom of 
territoriality explicitly recognized, there was no reason for the court to find 
that geographic proximity is necessary for confusion. After all, the internet 
does not discriminate on the basis of distance. When a court fails to take this 
fact into account, there is always a risk that consumer confusion will fly 
under the radar. 
B. A World of Travel 
It bears repeating that Dawn Donut was focused on consumer 
confusion, or more precisely, the lack thereof.121 As discussed above, the 
Second Circuit explicitly stated that “no public confusion is possible” when 
marks are used in two geographically distinct markets.122 Of course, this 
assertion no longer holds true in the age of the Internet. But the Internet is 
just one of many massive societal changes that have occurred since Dawn 
Donut. Also, the frequency of consumer travel has skyrocketed, completely 
altering consumer exposure to geographically distant marks. In the year after 
Dawn Donut was decided, airlines carried a total of 57.9 million 
passengers.123 By 2017, that number had risen to 741.7 million for domestic 
passengers alone—an increase of almost 1300 percent. 124  The Second 
Circuit recognized this fact in Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Restaurant, 
LLC.125 In analyzing likelihood of confusion, the court stated that because 
establishments like hotels and restaurants attract the traveling public, “even 
businesses that are separated by large distances may attract overlapping 
clientele due to the ease of travel,” and thus geographical distance does not 
negate the possibility of confusion.126 Nevertheless, the court qualified this 
 
to play a large role in the court’s holding. Id. This is unlike in Baskim where there were no sales in the 
junior user’s territory. Baskim, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156752, at *10–11.  
 120. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156752, at *10. 
 121. See supra section II.B. 
 122. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959).  
 123. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 885 (1999), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec31.pdf.  
 124. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, JANUARY 2018 U.S. AIRLINE TRAFFIC DATA (2018), 
https://www.bts.gov/newsroom/january-2018-us-airline-traffic-data.  
 125. 360 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Certain businesses such as hotels, and to a lesser degree 
restaurants, attract the traveling public.”). Because the court was reviewing a preliminary injunction, it 
was looking to likelihood of success on the merits and thus reviewed the mark’s distinctiveness, id. at 
130–31 This is slightly different than an injunction analysis intertwined with the infringement analysis, 
as was the case in Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 365. Nevertheless, the court’s comments regarding the 
interplay of geography and confusion are worth discussing, Brennan’s, 360 F.3d at 134–35.  
 126. Id. at 135.  
 
CONFUSION OF TRADEMARK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  8:52 PM 
2019 THE CONFUSION OF TRADEMARK TERRITORIALITY 347 
claim by noting that “substantial geographic separation remains a significant 
indicator that the likelihood of confusion is slight.”127  This qualification 
aligns with the interplay of confusion and territoriality. Geographic distance 
might make confusion less likely, but it certainly does not negate the 
possibility of confusion. 
David Barrett has argued that the law should offer greater territorial 
protections for marks that are associated with companies serving traveling 
consumers—namely hotels and restaurants.128  This argument aligns well 
with the court’s analysis in Brennan’s: geographic distance does not dispel 
confusion for perambulating consumers who travel from region to region. 
Along these lines, other courts have recognized the issue of traveling 
customers and have allowed the senior user to enjoin a junior user despite 
geographically remote operations. In the case of Gastown, Inc. v. Gastown, 
Inc., a district court in Connecticut dealt with two gas stations operating 
under identical names. 129  The defendant argued Dawn Donut barred an 
injunction because the closest use of the two marks was 443 miles apart.130 
The court noted, however, that some major service stations, distant as they 
may have been, were still placed along the same highway.131 Additionally, 
the court reasoned that it was not uncommon for a motorist “to drive from 
Hartford, Springfield, or Boston to Cleveland or Detroit in a single day over 
interstate super-highways.”132 As such, the court concluded that there was a 
likelihood of confusion and thus found that the Dawn Donut defense was 
inapplicable.133 
Similarly, a district court in Colorado found that the plaintiff operating 
under the name “SuperShuttle” could enjoin the defendant from using the 
mark SUPERSHUTTLE EXPRESS in the Denver airport, although the 
plaintiff did not operate there.134 First, the court did find that the plaintiff had 
 
 127. Id. (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364). 
 128. David S. Barrett, The Future of the Concurrent Use of Trademarks Doctrine in the Information 
Age, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 687, 700–03 (2000). For a nice example of a court recognizing 
this aspect of hotels, see Tisch Hotels v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1965) (finding 
that traveling customers may confuse the senior user’s hotel mark with the junior user’s hotel mark, 
despite operating in geographically distant locations).  
 129. Gastown, Inc. v. Gastown, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 626, 627 (D. Conn. 1971).  
 130. Id. at 629. 
 131. Id. at 630. 
 132. Id. at 632. 
 133. Id. at 632–33. 
 134. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer-Schonewill & Assocs., No. 95-D-2272, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21260, at *9–10 (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 1995). 
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shown that Denver was within its zone of natural expansion.135 However, 
even if the plaintiff had not demonstrated this, the court was aware that “both 
parties provide services primarily to individuals traveling from one airport 
to another,” and thus, the plaintiff would be unlikely to distinguish between 
the two uses, despite such uses being in “remote geographic regions.”136 
On the other hand, some courts are less inclined to worry about 
traveling customers. The Fifth Circuit has held that “[c]oncurrent ownership 
of marks in separate geographical territories is clearly permissible” because 
the fact that “an occasional purchaser will travel between geographical 
districts is not a large enough problem to justify outlawing concurrent 
trademark ownership.”137 And the Third Circuit has not done much better. In 
the case of Holiday Inns of America v. B & B Corp., the owner of HOLIDAY 
INN hotels sought to enjoin defendant’s use of HOLIDAY INN on its hotels 
in the Virgin Islands.138 The court initially seemed to be inclined to grant the 
traveling customer more protection by noting that “the development of 
today’s mobile society” has frustrated older trademark concepts regarding 
restricted or local markets.139 Nevertheless, the court denied the injunction 
until the plaintiff could show that it had actually entered the defendant’s 
territory.140 The court made this ruling despite also determining that the case 
involved an industry frequented by perambulating consumers and that there 
would almost certainly be confusion when the plaintiff entered the 
defendant’s territory. 141  Thus, because the court remained fixated on 
geographic territory, it permitted the confusion that may befall the traveling 
consumer. 
Holiday Inns perfectly demonstrates how concurrent use can go awry 
when courts fail to consider mobility. The court was entirely focused on the 
fact that Holiday Inns did not have a location in one specific area, despite 
 
 135. Id. at *9.  
 136. Id. at *9–10.  
 137. Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387–88 (5th Cir. 1977). 
This quote was in regard to forfeiture due to unrestrained licensing, but the court made the claim to justify 
concurrent uses, and so it is nonetheless very relevant for our analysis, id.  
 138. Holiday Inns of Am. v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 615 (3d Cir. 1969).  
 139. Id. at 617. Note that this case was decided in 1969, before communication became instantaneous 
with the advent of the Internet, and at a time of far less travel. Even so, its rule has been followed in more 
recent cases. See, e.g., Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc. v. Arkay Donuts, LLC, No. 05-387 (JWB), 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 43522, at *15 (D.N.J. Apr. 13, 2005) (quoting Holiday Inns for the proposition that “injunctive 
force may be unleashed only against conditions generating a presently existing actual threat.”); Cohen’s 
Fashion Optical, Inc. v. Cohen, No. 94-297, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22494, at *12–15 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 
30, 1996) (applying the holding from Holiday Inns as a variant of Dawn Donut in the Third Circuit).  
 140. Holiday Inns, 409 F.2d at 618.  
 141. Id. 
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otherwise being a national chain with national advertising campaigns.142 
This fact alone might suggest that concurrent uses should not be allowed. 
Yet, most importantly, the case involved the hotel industry, whose very 
essence is tied to the traveling consumer. If concurrent uses are supposed to 
be permitted only when there is no likelihood of consumer confusion, then 
this is undermined when a court ignores the nature of the industry and the 
possibility of mobile consumers. Drawing these arbitrary borders will often 
frustrate the purpose of shielding consumers from confusion. 
IV. THE UNIFYING POWER OF CONFUSION 
As the previous section demonstrated, current territoriality doctrine 
struggles to account for societal advancements over the past few decades. 
Both concurrent use for common law marks and the Dawn Donut for 
registered marks fail to adequately protect consumers from possible 
confusion. But trademark law does not need an entire reformation. Instead, 
the territoriality issue can be entirely captured by the likelihood of confusion 
analysis. As discussed earlier, the remoteness inquiry at its core is meant to 
track consumer awareness. Because of this, there is no reason for a court to 
determine territorial rights and then move onto a separate infringement 
discussion. Consumer awareness, and thus remoteness, will be entirely 
captured by the infringement analysis. 
This proposal immediately raises two potential technical issues to 
address before proceeding. First, one might be concerned that this synthesis 
would change the evidence required to demonstrate likelihood of confusion. 
However, no evidentiary overhaul is needed, because it is a factual issue to 
both determine a trademark’s territory 143  and to evaluate likelihood of 
confusion. 144  Thus, any factual evidence that was once required to 
demonstrate territory will merely be shifted to the infringement inquiry. 
 
 142. Id. at 615, 617.  
 143. See Peaches Entm’t Corp. v. Entm’t Repertoire Assocs., 62 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(“[F]inding the territorial scope of trademark rights has been a question of fact.”); Hispanic Broad. Corp. 
v. Educ. Media Found., No. CV-02-7134 CAS (AJWx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24804, at *22 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 30, 2003) (“[F]or the same reasons that the likelihood of confusion analysis turns on disputed factual 
issues, the issue of whether [defendant’s] first use was in a ‘“remote area’” cannot be decided on a motion 
for summary judgment.”); Popular Bank v. Banco Popular, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1998) 
(“The actual geographic area a party carves out is a question of fact.”). 
 144. See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1024 (3d Cir. 2008) (“ . . . likelihood of 
confusion is a question of fact.”); Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 328 (5th Cir. 
2008) (“Likelihood of confusion is a question of fact reviewed for clear error.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Nevertheless, courts are still willing to grant summary judgment on issues of confusion. See 
Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., 726 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Likelihood of confusion is 
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Second, one might worry about laches. If a trademark holder can 
acquire territorial rights in an area without using her mark there, then it is 
possible that the mark holder may not know the territorial extent of her rights. 
So, it may be possible that her rights are infringed in a particular area without 
her knowledge, and if she waits too long to sue due to this lack of knowledge, 
the doctrine of laches might bar her suit. However, the Fourth Circuit’s 
conception of laches obviates this concern by placing no obligation to sue on 
a mark holder until the “likelihood of confusion looms large.”145 Thus, the 
plaintiff is barred only if she has “unreasonably delayed” her pursuit of a 
remedy.146 As such, it is doubtful that a court will consider a plaintiff to have 
unreasonably delayed its pursuit of a remedy if she was unaware that she had 
such a right. Only when she becomes aware of her rights in an area will the 
laches clock begin to run. 
With these technical issues resolved, the following sections will detail 
how the likelihood of confusion analysis nearly encompasses trademark. 
First, the paper will turn to the common law doctrine to see how this 
incorporation plays out. Then, with this backdrop, the paper will move to 
federal law, advocating for the abolition of Dawn Donut in a world of 
synthesized territoriality and confusion. 
A. The Common Law Solution 
Because federal registration is the prevalent norm, one might wonder 
what role common law marks still play in trademark law. As it turns out, 
common law marks still play an important role. Although many businesses 
do register their marks, there are specific industries that frequently do not 
resort to federal registration. The restaurant industry is one such group. This 
fact is particularly important for our purposes because restaurants often have 
an internet presence (due to services like Yelp and Seamless) and are 
common destinations for travelers. 
Common law marks are still prevalent in the restaurant industry. To 
demonstrate this, the names of restaurants from four major U.S. were 
searched using the Trademark Electronic Search System to determine which 
 
a question of fact, but the court may grant summary judgment in appropriate circumstances.”); see also 
Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 775 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Although likelihood of confusion is a 
question of fact, it may be decided as a matter of law.”). 
 145. Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 462 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing MCCARTHY, 
supra note 22, at § 31.06(2)(c)). 
 146. Id. 
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restaurants had not registered their marks.147 In every city, a minority of 
restaurants had registered their marks. In Portland, Oregon, 29 of 38 
restaurant marks were unregistered.148 Likewise, in Seattle, Washington, 29 
of 38 marks were unregistered.149 In Austin, Texas, 29 of 38 marks were 
unregistered.150 Even in a city like New York, New York, 25 of 38 marks 
were unregistered.151 Thus, just about three-quarters of listed restaurants in 
all four cities had not registered their marks.152 To be sure, this analysis is 
not a rigorous empirical study, but the numbers nonetheless seem to suggest 
 
 147. The list of restaurants were obtained through the “38 Essential Restaurants” lists for each city 
put out in January 2018 by Eater, a food blog. See Mattie John Bamman & Eater Staff, The 38 Essential 
Portland Restaurants, Winter 2018, EATER (Jan. 9, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://pdx.eater.com/maps/38-
best-portland-oregon-restaurants [https://perma.cc/7TX9-YSH7]; Eater Staff, The 38 Essential Seattle 
Restaurants, Winter 2018, EATER (Jan. 9, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://seattle.eater.com/maps/best-seattle-
restaurants-38 [https://web.archive.org/web20180117212844/http://seattle.eater.com/maps/best-seattle-
restaurants-38]; Nadia Chaudhury, The 38 Essential Austin Restaurants, Winter 2018, EATER (Jan. 9, 
2018, 1:17 PM), https://austin.eater.com/maps/best-restaurants-austin-eater-38-map 
[https://web.archive.org/web20180109210345/http://austin.eater.com/maps/best-restaurants-austin-
eater-38-map]; Eater Staff, The 38 Essential Restaurants in New York City, Winter 2018, EATER (Jan. 9, 
2018, 1:43 PM), https://ny.eater.com/maps/best-new-york-restaurants-38-map 
[https://web.archive.org/web20180203083717/http://ny.eater.com/maps/best-new-york-restaurants-38-
map]. 
 148. The unregistered marks were: ATAULA, RESTAURANT ST. JACK, KEN’S ARTISAN 
BAKERY, MI MERO MOLE, MÅURICE, IMPERIAL, DEPARTURE, HIGGINS RESTAURANT 
AND BAR, DUCK HOUSE CHINESE RESTAURANT, OLYMPIA PROVISIONS SE, HOLDFAST 
DINING, BIWA KITCHEN, FARM SPIRIT, CASTAGNA, BOLLYWOOD THEATER, AVA 
GENE’S, HAN OAK, TUSK, LANGBAAN, LAURELHURST MARKWT, APIZZA SCHOLLS, ROSE 
VL DELI, COQUINE, TORO BRAVO, MILK GLASS MARKET, PODNAH’S PIT BBQ, BEAST, 
MAE, and PIP’S ORIGINAL. 
 149. The unregistered marks were HITCHOCK RESTAURANT, FLINTCREEK CATTLE CO., 
CAFÉ MUNIR, WATARU, KEDAI MAKAN, JUNEBABY, THE WANDERING GOOSE, TARSAN I 
JANE, WESTWARD, JOULE, WINDY CITY PIE, LI’L WOODY’S, STATESIDE, SPINASSE, 
BATEAU, LARK, NO ANCHOR, LE PICHET, SUSHI KASHIBA, MATT’S IN THE MARKET, 
NIRMAL’S, THE LONDON PLANE, TSUKUSHINBO, HUONG BINH, BAR DEL CORSO, 
MARINATION MA KAI, MASHIKO, TAQUERIA LA FONDITA, and NOODLE BOAT THAI 
RESTAURANT. 
 150. The unregistered marks were L’OCA D’ORO, SALT & TIME, EMMER & RYE, EPICERIE, 
KOMÉ, DAI DUE, OLAMAIE, VIA 313, APIS, DIN HO CHINESE BBQ, BIDERMAN’S DELI, 
CONTIGO, EASTSIDE CAFÉ, JEFFREY’S, OLAMAIE, MICKLETHWAIT CRAFT MEATS, 
BUENOS AIRES CAFE, TAMALE HOUSE EAST, EL NARANJO, VERACRUZ ALL NATURAL, 
DEE DEE, JUSTINE’S BRASSERIE, LAUNDERETTE, LENOIR, BOULDIN CREEK CAFÉ, EL 
PRIMO, SICHUAN RIVER, TASTE OF ETHIOPIA, and VALENTINA’S TEX MEX BBQ. 
 151. Those marks were SPICY VILLAGE, FLAMING KITCHEN, LE COUCOU, WILDAIR, 
UNCLE BOONS, PRUNE, I SODI, OIJI, HANOI HOUSE, SHUKO, ALDEA, COTE KOREAN 
STEAKHOUSE, THE GRILL, INDIAN ACCENT, BOULUD SUD, FLORA BAR, CHARLES 
COUNTY PAN FRIED, DUMPLING GALAXY, LILIA, PETER LUGER STEAK HOUSE, MARLOW 
& SONS, ROBERT’S, LA VARA, OLMSTED, EL ATORADERO, HOMETOWN BAR-B-QUE. 
 152. It is important to note that some of these unregistered marks may be unregistered not due to a 
lack of desire to do so, but simply because the mark cannot be registered for some other reason, such as 
lack of distinctiveness. 
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that it is not uncommon for a restaurant to forego registering its mark. As 
such, common law marks continue to play a role in trademark law. 
This focus on restaurants may lead one to conclude that the concurrent 
use doctrine at common law does not need total reformation. Instead, perhaps 
restaurants could have a unique territoriality doctrine. But this would be 
misguided. The problems identified in previous sections are not unique to 
restaurants. After all, restaurants are not the only industries that have 
perambulating customers. Should the occasional gas station or hotel that 
utilizes a common law mark use this special territoriality doctrine? And 
although federal registration is standard, it is incredibly likely that Internet 
users will encounter common law marks while online. 
For the sake of parsimony, and to avoid creating an under-inclusive test, 
territoriality should be applied uniformly for all types of marks. This means 
that the common law concurrent use doctrine must be reformed to account 
for the Internet and mass travel. In what follows, the paper argues that this 
reform does not require any new tests. Instead, the territoriality analysis 
should be entirely subsumed by the likelihood of confusion test. Both 
remoteness (zone of goodwill and natural expansion) and good faith can be 
wholly captured by the factors in the likelihood of confusion test. 
1. Remoteness 
a. Zone of Actual Goodwill 
Recall that the remoteness inquiry at common law focuses on the zone 
of actual goodwill, which is divided into two subclasses: market penetration 
and reputation. As discussed before, the zone of market penetration has four 
commonly-used factors (1) amount of sales involving the trademark; (2) 
positive and negative growth trends in the geographical area; (3) the number 
of purchasing customers in relation to the total number of potential 
customers; and (4) amount of advertising in the geographical area.153 The 
major flaw with this test is that it is unequipped to deal with confusion caused 
by the Internet and perambulating customers. The zone of reputation, on the 
other hand, is well-suited for these phenomena because it does not arbitrarily 
draw lines based on geography. Instead, the zone of reputation is meant to 
align entirely with areas where a sufficient number of consumers recognize 
the mark. That is, it attempts to locate the areas where consumers may be 
 
 153. Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398–99 (3d Cir. 1985). The 
Natural Footwear factors have been endorsed by multiple other circuits. See, e.g., Allard Enters. v. 
Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2001); Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 
984, 989 (9th Cir. 1995); Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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confused, not just those areas where the mark is used. Thus, the zone of 
reputation is crucial for adequately evaluating confusion. 
Initially, it may seem difficult to determine the extent of a reputational 
zone without reference to actual sales. As such, courts have attempted to set 
out concrete factors to determine the scope of such a zone. For example, the 
Southern District of Florida set out a few valuable factors in Popular Bank 
v. Banco Popular.154 The case involved two banks. One operated entirely in 
Miami, Florida, and the other began operations in Puerto Rico, eventually 
spreading its advertisements and operations to several parts of Florida, 
including Miami.155 Banco Popular argued that it had territorial rights in 
Southern Florida—even in places where it did not have banks—due to its 
reputation in the area. To analyze this, the court devised three factors for 
determining whether reputation without sales could establish trademark 
rights in an area, looking at the amount of (1) advertising in the area, (2) 
goods bearing the mark that are transported into the territory, and (3) 
customers in the territory that visit the business. 156  These factors make 
intuitive sense, and they attempt to address at least one problem with 
territoriality, namely the perambulating customer. 
Yet, courts have yet to flesh-out an adequate test for dealing with the 
Internet, either under the zone of reputation or penetration. W. Scott 
Creasman has suggested that courts ought to merge both penetration and 
reputation into a five-factor test when analyzing Internet marks (1) volume 
of internet sales, (2) growth trends, (3) sales as a function of the total market, 
(4) distribution of sales points, and (5) specific targeting, including brick-
and-mortar advertising.157 However, as Shontavia Johnson has pointed out, 
Creasman does not consider the number of visitors to the mark holder’s 
websites nor the amount of money spent on Internet marketing tools.158 Thus, 
in response, Johnson has proposed a test that asks a single underlying 
question: has there been trademark use or penetration sufficient to create a 
lasting impression in the consumer’s mind in the relevant geographical 
region?159 To determine this, Johnson suggests applying Creasman’s five 
factors, coupled with four more (6) type and amount of Internet advertising, 
 
 154. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1355 (S.D Fla. 1998). 
 155. Id. at 1351–52. 
 156. Id. at 1355. Although the court was open to granting rights on the basis of reputation, it found 
that the Puerto Rican bank had failed to establish a zone of reputation, id. 
 157. Creasman, supra note 19, at 1032–33. 
 158. Johnson, supra note 19, at 1288. 
 159. Id. at 1289–90. 
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(7) length and manner of presence on the Internet, (8) the purpose and 
character of the internet presence, and (9) the number of unique monthly 
Internet visitors.160 
The creation of a new multi-factor test for territoriality on the Internet 
is entirely unnecessary. Johnson defends the use of this seemingly unwieldy 
nine-factor test by pointing out that trademark law has plenty of multi-factor 
tests, such as the eight-plus factor infringement test.161 Fair enough. But I 
propose an even simpler solution: forget all these tests for territoriality and 
simply use the multi-factor infringement test. In analyzing infringement, 
courts commonly look to several factors (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) 
defendant’s intent, (3) actual confusion, (4) proximity of the goods (i.e., the 
similarity of the goods/services), (5) strength of the plaintiff’s mark, (6) 
consumer sophistication, (7) likelihood of bridging the gap (how likely the 
plaintiff is to enter the defendant’s market), and (8) comparative quality of 
the goods. 162  Different circuits take different approaches to consumer 
confusion, but all utilize factors similar to the these.163 One additional prong 
considered by multiple other circuits is especially vital to our analysis (9) 
similarity of advertising methods164 or marketing channels.165 
Three of these infringement factors align with the zones of penetration 
or reputation: marketing channels, advertising channels, and evidence of 
actual confusion. Together, these three factors look to where the product is 
sold, advertised, and recognized by consumers. These elements sufficiently 
capture the thrust of both the zones of penetration and reputation, even if 
some aspects of the territoriality tests left behind. For example, the likelihood 
of confusion test does not compare the number of sales to the size of the 
market, as is done in the penetration analysis. Nor does it weigh the number 
 
 160. Id. at 1290. 
 161. Id. at 1291. 
 162. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 163. See, e.g., DeCosta v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 606 (1st Cir. 1992) (analyzing trading 
channels and relation of advertising instead of comparative quality and likelihood of bridging the gap); 
Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying the Polaroid factors); 
Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1087 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying the 
Polaroid factors); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir. 1986) (utilizing 
four factors: similarity of marks, the defendant’s intent, proximity of the goods, and consumer 
sophistication); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983) (looking also to the price 
of the goods and the length of time the defendant has used the mark); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big 
Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982) (looking to “marketing channels used” as 
opposed to comparative quality); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(looking to “marketing channels used” instead of comparative quality). 
 164. See DeCosta, 981 F.2d at 606; Interpace, 721 F.2d at 463. 
 165. See Frisch’s’, 670 F.2d at 648; AMF, Inc., 599 F.2d at 348–49. 
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of monthly visitors to a website, which Johnson proposed for her Internet 
test. But if avoiding confusion is the end-goal of trademark law, then these 
factors are unnecessary. Consider this: if mark P and mark Q look entirely 
different, are sold in entirely different markets, and are advertised through 
entirely different marketing channels, what is the purpose of determining 
what percentage of a specific territory buys P in relation to the territory’s 
total population? In the end, if there is no likelihood of confusion, then the 
number of sales is meaningless because P and Q can coexist.166 Thus, the 
zones of penetration and reputation do not require any extensive territorial 
inquiries that are not already covered by the likelihood of confusion analysis. 
b. Zone of Natural Expansion 
The zones of penetration and reputation may be accounted for, but the 
infringement analysis must also account for the zone of natural expansion to 
satisfy remoteness. Recall that there are multiple tests for expansion, but a 
common one embraced by multiple circuits looks to (1) the mark holder’s 
previous business activity, (2) any previous expansions or lack thereof, (3) 
contiguousness of expansion areas, (4) presently-planned expansions, and 
(5) whether products are brought into the supposed expansion area from 
other regions.167 The zone of natural expansion differs from penetration and 
reputation in that it does not attempt to identify present confusion, but instead 
future confusion. Initially, then, it may seem as though the likelihood of 
confusion test cannot capture the purpose of natural expansion. Luckily, the 
infringement analysis set out in Polaroid can deal with this issue in its 
“bridging the gap” factor. 
Bridging the gap refers to a situation where the “senior user presently 
intends to expand his sales efforts to compete directly with the junior 
user.”168 The Southern District of New York has indicated that it protects the 
senior user’s interest in “preserving avenues of expansion and entering into 
related fields.” 169  In the past, courts seemed to be less concerned with 
geographic distance, and more concerned about “competitive distance” when 
it comes to likelihood of bridging the gap.170 This focus on competitive 
 
 166. Of course, this assumes that neither is liable for any other trademark claim, such as dilution. 
 167. Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 523 (C.C.P.A. 1980). See also Spartan 
Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1987); Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & 
Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 168. Lambda Elecs. Corp. v. Lambda Tech., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 169. E.S. Originals, Inc. v. Stride Rite Corp., 656 F. Supp. 484, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing 
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). 
 170. See, e.g., The Deal v. Korangy Publ’g, 309 F. Supp. 2d 512, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); New Colt 
Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 195, 226 (D. Conn. 2004). 
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distance would deal with concerns about consumer confusion. If a mark is 
not competitively proximate to another mark, either by market or geography, 
then two consumers are not likely to be confused. However, if a mark may 
soon become competitive with another mark, then this is something that must 
be taken into account. The “bridging the gap” factor deals with this issue by 
looking to whether two marks will become competitively proximate. 
To be sure, “bridging the gap” most commonly refers to market 
distance, not geographic reach, unlike the zone of natural expansion. 
However, as discussed above, geography is merely a proxy for consumer 
awareness. As long as bridging the gap captures a likelihood of future 
confusion, then it has served the underlying purpose of territoriality. 
If one believes that territorial expansion ought to be accounted for, then 
courts need to only slightly alter the factor to align with the Second Circuit. 
In the Second Circuit, “bridging the gap” becomes important when the junior 
user shows that the senior operates in either “a different field of enterprise or 
a different geographic area.”171  By framing the inquiry in this way, the 
Second Circuit has explicitly recognized that “bridging the gap” can be used 
to look at future market expansion or geographic expansion. Although this 
conception of “bridging the gap” may not yet be embraced by every circuit, 
it has the potential to capture the purpose of the zone of natural expansion. 
If other courts adopt a conception of “bridging the gap” that includes future 
expansions to a geographic area, then the zone of natural expansion can be 
completely captured by this factor of the infringement test. But even if courts 
do not shift their conception of “bridging the gap,” then the zone of natural 
expansion is still tested by an analysis of future market moves. This inquiry 
tests potential consumer awareness, which is the motivating force behind the 
zone of natural expansion. 
2. Good Faith 
For the infringement analysis to completely supplant common law 
territoriality, it must also account for the good faith prong, i.e., the second 
requirement of concurrent use.172 Like above, this requirement is completely 
captured by the likelihood of confusion analysis—this time by the 
“defendant’s intent” factor. Courts have held that this factor of the confusion 
analysis looks to the defendant’s “intent to confuse or deceive consumers as 
 
 171. Guthrie Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 826 F.3d 27, 45 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 172. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918). 
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to the product’s source”173 or to the defendant’s intent to capitalize on the 
plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill.174 
The good faith requirement of territoriality varies across jurisdictions. 
Multiple circuits have taken the requirement of good faith to mean that the 
junior user must not have any knowledge of the senior user’s mark.175 This 
understanding seems to suggest that in such jurisdictions, a junior user 
jeopardizes her good faith by merely doing a Google search of a mark before 
its adoption.176 In contrast, other courts have held that mere knowledge is 
insufficient to destroy good faith.177  For example, the Tenth Circuit has 
emphasized that although a junior user’s subsequent adoption of a mark with 
knowledge of the senior user’s mark “can certainly support an inference of 
bad faith, mere knowledge should not foreclose further inquiry.”178 Instead, 
good faith hinges on “whether the second user had the intent to benefit from 
the reputation or goodwill of the first user.”179 This approach more closely 
resembles the intent inquiry within the likelihood of confusion analysis. 
Although some circuits hold that intent to copy is sufficient to infer 
likelihood of confusion in the infringement analysis,180 an overwhelming 
majority of circuits do not think that a defendant’s knowledge alone is 
 
 173. Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (italics omitted). 
 174. W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co., 808 F. Supp. 1013, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 175. See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 437 (9th Cir. 2017) (“. 
. .there is no good faith if the junior user had knowledge of the senior user’s prior use.”); Nat’l Ass’n for 
Healthcare Commc’ns Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that the use was “in good faith, without knowledge of [the senior user’s] prior use”); Money 
Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 674–75 (7th Cir. 1982) (“A good faith junior user is one who 
begins using a mark with no knowledge that someone else is already using it.”). 
 176. See MNI Mgmt., Inc. v. Wine King, LLC, 542 F. Supp. 2d 389, 412–13 (D.N.J. 2008) 
(discussing how good faith could have been destroyed had the defendant done a Google search and found 
plaintiff’s mark, but ultimately finding that there was no evidence that the defendant had knowledge of 
the mark). 
 177. C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2001) (“. . . knowledge of use 
is but one factor in a good faith inquiry”); DeCosta v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 611–12 (1st Cir. 
1992) (finding that bad faith is an intent or expectation to cause confusion); Members First Fed. Credit 
Union v. Members 1st Fed. Credit Union, 54 F. Supp. 2d 393, 409 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that the 
concurrent use defense would be unavailable due to the junior user’s knowledge of the senior’s mark); 
Accu Pers., Inc. v. AccuStaff, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1191, 1211 (D. Del. 1994) (“. . . a junior user’s prior 
knowledge of a senior user’s trademark use is probative of, but not dispositive of, the question whether 
the junior user acted in bad faith.”). 
 178. GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 998 (1990). 
 179. Id. 
 180. E.g., Streamline Prod. Sys. v. Streamline Mfg., 851 F.3d 440, 455 (5th Cir. 2017) (“. . . a 
defendant’s intent to confuse may alone be sufficient to justify an inference that there is likelihood of 
confusion.”) (citation omitted); Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., 726 F.3d 1136, 1157 (10th Cir. 
2013) (“. . . evidence of intent to copy may justify an inference of likelihood of confusion.”). 
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sufficient for such an inference. 181  Thus, because confusion underlies 
territoriality, the courts that currently apply a knowledge standard for good 
faith in the territoriality analysis are misguided. After all, in the actual 
confusion analysis, a majority of courts do not accept that knowledge entails 
confusion. And this makes sense. The mere fact that the junior user knew of 
the senior user’s mark says nothing about consumer confusion. 
In response, proponents of the knowledge standard assert that confusion 
can be presumed if the junior user knew of the senior user’s mark.182 But as 
Thomas Cotter has pointed out, there seems to be little reason to accept this 
claim without evidence that the junior user’s knowledge bears a meaningful 
correlation to consumer knowledge.183 This is because the intent factor is 
ultimately grounded in the likelihood of consumer confusion, like the rest of 
infringement analysis.184 To this end, the Third Circuit has even held that an 
explicit intent to copy is not alone sufficient to infer confusion.185 Confusion 
can only be inferred if the intent to confuse is “demonstrated via purposeful 
manipulation of the junior mark to resemble the senior’s.”186 
Because knowledge does not entail confusion, and because the 
touchstone of territoriality is consumer awareness, then mere knowledge 
should not bar a finding good faith for concurrent use. This means that the 
likelihood of confusion analysis will completely capture the good faith 
requirement of concurrent use, even in those jurisdictions that adopt a 
knowledge standard for good faith. Such jurisdictions have become 
disconnected from the purpose of the doctrine: to protect consumers from 
 
 181. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. IJR Capital Invs., L.L.C., 891 F.3d 178, 196 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(holding that “mere awareness” does not establish bad intent); Progressive Distrib. Servs. v. UPS, Inc., 
856 F.3d 416, 436 (6th Cir. 2017) (“However, knowledge of a trademark, alone, will not support a finding 
of intent to confuse . . .”); Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1159 (claiming that knowledge of the senior’s mark 
may not be the intent relevant for the confusion analysis); Sensient Techs. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor 
Co., 613 F.3d 754, 767 (8th Cir. 2010) (“. . . knowledge did not equate with an intent to mislead.”); 
Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 551 F.3d 65, 75 (1st Cit. 2008) (distinguishing between bad faith and 
willfulness, the latter of which requires knowledge alone); Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 
644–45 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that knowledge is not sufficient to demonstrate fraudulent intent); A&H 
Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2000);  Sports Auth., 
Inc. v. Prime Hosp. Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 964 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that knowledge does not necessarily 
give rise to an inference of bad). But see Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 
434 (9th Cir. 2017) (“. . . choosing a designation with knowledge that it is another’s trademark permits a 
presumption of intent to deceive.”). 
 182. See David S. Welkowitz, The Problem of Concurrent Use of Trademarks: An Old/New 
Proposal, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 315, 332 (“The most forceful justification for this principle is that name 
confusion can be presumed from the fact of the junior user’s knowledge—if the junior user knows of the 
other use, so must other people.”). 
 183. Cotter, supra note 11, at 535–36. 
 184. A&H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 225. 
 185. Id. at 225–26. 
 186. Id. 
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confusion. Because the intent factor in the infringement analysis concerns 
itself with consumer confusion, that factor is wholly sufficient to capture the 
good faith requirement of Theodore Rectanus. 
In sum, both the remoteness and good faith prong of concurrent use can 
be captured by the likelihood of confusion analysis. Thus, applying a 
separate test for common law territoriality is entirely unnecessary, and such 
tests should be discarded. That is not the end of the argument, however. The 
final section shows that territorial limitations under federal law must be 
discarded as well. 
B. Farewell, Dawn Donut 
In a regime of nationwide constructive use, a trademark holder’s 
territorial rights are not segmented as they would be common law since her 
territorial rights become national upon registration. Nevertheless, as the 
reader will recall, territorial barriers are not entirely absent with federally-
registered marks. The doctrine of Dawn Donut can prevent injunctive relief 
notwithstanding the senior’s national rights, thus causing the same pitfalls 
that are present in the common law territoriality doctrine. Internet users and 
perambulating customers do not cease to exist once a mark has been 
registered federally. Because of this, it is crucial that courts determine the 
scope of injunctions in reference to consumer confusion and do not adopt a 
misguided requirement of physical presence. In other words, courts must 
condition injunctions on consumer confusion, not territorial proximity, thus 
eliminating Dawn Donut. 
The decision to discard Dawn Donut is not novel. As mentioned in the 
introductory section on Dawn Donut, the Sixth Circuit has altogether 
rejected the doctrine. There, courts begin their inquiry by determining 
whether there is a likelihood of confusion at all.187 If infringement is found, 
and there are no applicable defenses, then an injunction is permitted without 
any territorial inquiry because “no particular finding of likelihood of entry” 
is required for an injunction.188 Thus, by rejecting Dawn Donut, the Sixth 
Circuit blends the likelihood of confusion analysis with that of territoriality: 
if the junior’s use has created a likelihood of confusion in a particular area, 
 
 187. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d 377, 380–81 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 188. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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then the senior user may obtain injunctive relief in that area, and thus has 
territorial rights there.189 
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Carmax, Judge Jones wrote in a 
concurrence that Dawn Donut does not override the confusion inquiry 
because the likelihood of entry into a market is but one factor in the 
analysis.190 The Middle District of Pennsylvania took this same approach in 
Members First Federal Credit Union v. Members 1st Fed. Credit Union, 
when the court refused to “supplant” the ten-factor likelihood of confusion 
test with Dawn Donut.191 The court in Members First was right to use the 
word “supplant.” By applying Dawn Donut, courts override any 
determination of confusion just because of geographical distance, thereby 
supplanting the entire confusion inquiry. Perhaps this was appropriate when 
confusion was unlikely due to distance, but as has been shown, this can no 
longer be presumed in light of the Internet and mass travel. 
It seems that the Second Circuit—the court that originally devised the 
Dawn Donut rule—has partially rethought its stance on territoriality as well. 
Return to the case of Guthrie discussed earlier for its take on the Internet.192 
The plaintiff, Guthrie, owned and operated various medical facilities and 
specialized healthcare facilities, primarily within Northern Pennsylvania and 
Southern New York (deemed Guthrie’s “service area”).193 The defendant, 
ContextMedia, delivered health-related content to physician practices in all 
fifty states. 194  The district court held that ContextMedia’s mark was 
confusingly similar to Guthrie’s, and enjoined ContextMedia’s use in 
Guthrie’s service area.195 But no injunction issued for locations outside of 
Guthrie’s service area because the court found that there was no likelihood 
of confusion, although Guthrie maintained patient treatment facilities in two 
New York counties beyond its service area.196 The Second Circuit reversed, 
holding that a senior user who has shown that she is entitled to an injunction 
 
 189. See id. (“The Sixth Circuit has an eight point test for infringement liability under the Lanham 
Act . . . [l]ikelihood of entry is just one of the eight factors under this test, and it is not dispositive of 
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in one geographic territory need not show the same probability of harm in 
every further area into which the injunction might extend.197 Instead, the 
senior user “must show evidence of plausibly foreseeable confusion beyond 
its main area of injury.”198 This analysis will turn on a case’s “particular 
facts,” but the court in Guthrie found that the plaintiff had met this burden. 
Thus, once a plaintiff has demonstrated likelihood of confusion in one area, 
the Second Circuit will not require a showing of likelihood of confusion for 
all other areas. The injunction will be denied only if the junior user can 
affirmatively show that there is no likelihood of confusion in a particular 
area.199 In one respect, this case simply sets up a presumption of confusion 
in all areas where the senior user operates if the senior has shown a likelihood 
of confusion in one area. Moreover, this case can be read to mean that an 
injunction can be issued wherever the senior can demonstrate some 
“plausibly foreseeable confusion.” Understood this way, the rigidity of 
Dawn Donut would be bent to the breaking point. 
Although these courts are all correct to weaken or reject Dawn Donut, 
it is crucial that the holdings do not become too detached from consumer 
confusion. For example, the court in Guthrie concluded that when a senior 
user shows likelihood of confusion in territory A, she need not undergo the 
same in-depth confusion analysis for territory B to get an injunction.200 The 
facts of Guthrie undoubtedly helped shape this rule, for the senior user had 
an actual presence in territory B as well as A in the case. Yet, in cases like 
CarMax, the court seemed to indicate that an injunction can follow from a 
demonstration of likelihood of confusion in the abstract, and confusion did 
not need to be shown in a particular area. 201  However, likelihood of 
confusion must remain critical to the territory analysis. If a senior user has 
demonstrated a likelihood of confusion in territory A but has no presence in 
territory B, then the burden must remain on the senior user to demonstrate a 
likelihood of confusion in territory B before she can receive an injunction.202 
The purpose of this paper is not to eliminate concurrent use. After all, there 
is evidence that the number of good trademarks is limited—and we are 
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running out.203 The choice between adopting Dawn Donut and granting mark 
holders nationwide injunctive rights is not binary. Trademark rights, and the 
subsequent right to enjoin others, must always be grounded in avoiding 
consumer confusion. 
At first glance, it may seem overly burdensome to require a senior user 
to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in every area where the junior user 
makes use of the mark. However, this is not as arduous as it may appear. 
After all, most of the likelihood of confusion factors will not need to be 
repeated for each location. For example, similarity of the marks, defendant’s 
intent, consumer sophistication, and strength of the mark can all be done 
once. Only actual confusion, likelihood of bridging the gap, and 
advertising/marketing channels will need to be repeated for different regions. 
But, under the old territoriality regime, this must be done as well. At common 
law, courts would need to conduct a remoteness analysis for every area at 
issue. Thus, the territory-infringement synthesis would be no additional work 
for common law marks. 
To be sure, the CarMax and Guthrie approach would be less work for 
courts than the synthesis, since injunctions could be issued everywhere after 
a finding of confusion in the abstract. Nevertheless, simple does not always 
mean better. One must remember that overprotection of intellectual property 
is just as harmful to the consumer as under-protection.204 To serve the goals 
of trademark law, and prevent overprotection of trademark rights, courts 
must look at likelihood of confusion in each area of potential confusion, and 
enjoin use on that basis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It was once unlikely that a consumer in New York would see a 
trademark being used in Seattle. However, the Internet and mass travel have 
pushed those days far behind us. Nevertheless, trademark law has yet to catch 
up with changing times. Both common law trademarks and federally 
registered trademarks suffer from pitfalls in the doctrine of territoriality, and 
thus both are due for some updating. But the law does not need a massive 
overhaul because the likelihood of confusion test provides all the necessary 
tools to combat the issues plaguing territoriality. The solution is incredibly 
simple: forget the stand-alone tests for territoriality and apply a likelihood of 
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confusion analysis. If consumers in area A are likely to confuse marks P and 
Q, then only permit the senior user to use the mark in area A. There does not 
need to be a separate inquiry into the geographic distance between P and Q; 
this is but one factor among many in the infringement analysis. The 
incorporation of territoriality into the infringement test will both add analytic 
clarity and protect an entire swath of consumers from possible confusion. 
Thus, while trademark law is currently confused, it need only embrace 
confusion to sort itself out. 
 
